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Spontaneous Privatization, the Rise 
and Decline of MEBO
Privatization of public enterprises in 
China started with small and medium state-
owned and collective enterprises under the 
jurisdiction of county-level governments. The 
drive was triggered by the deterioration of 
business at these enterprises stemming from 
increasing market competition since the early 
1990s and the resultant fi nancial plight of lo-
cal governments.
At the earlier stage of privatization, the 
dominant form was conversion to employee-
owned enterprises by means of management-
employee buyout(MEBO) which was more 
palatable to employees and was likely to raise 
few ideological issues. Privatization through 
MEBO helped privatized entities slip out from 
under the protective wings of governments 
and strengthen their internal discipline. How-
ever, the egalitarian ownership by virtually all 
employees had serious setbacks such as inef-
fi ciency in decision-making, which could not 
be left unattended. With the growing aware-
ness of this problem, privatization through 
the concentration of capital in the hands of 
managers and executives or straightforward 
buyout by private companies was increasingly 
encouraged. 
From Corporatization to Privatization 
of Large Enterprises
The wave of privatization has gradual-
ly spread to larger enterprises after political 
constraints imposed on privatization of pub-
lic enterprises and on private companies were 
signifi cantly eased following the 15th Con-
gress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
in 1997. In particular, some public enterpris-
es that have seen remarkable development by 
successfully adapting to an evolving environ-
ment under transition to a market economy 
thanks to the exceptional capabilities of their 
managers are now moving toward genuine 
privatization at the initiative of those manag-
ers.
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese gov-
ernment has been pressing ahead with reor-
ganization of large state-owned and collective 
enterprises into joint-stock companies and 
their listings on the stock market as an inte-
gral part of enterprise reform. Reorganiza-
tion into joint-stock companies and their ex-
change listings can be regarded virtually as 
a process of phased privatization. But the ra-
tio of state-owned shares in listed enterprises 
is still as high as thirty to forty percent on av-
erage. There have been frequent cases where 
parent state-owned enterprises that control 
state-owned shares have taken advantage of 
their effective control over listed enterprises 
to act against the interests of minority share-
holders, which in some cases have gone so 
far as to destabilize the fi nancial sustainabil-
ity of listed enterprises. This problem, com-
bined with the pressing need to raise resourc-
es to cover the huge implicit public pension 
debt,prompted the government to launch a 
divestiture policy of state-owned shares in list-
ed enterprises in 2001. Attention is now being 
focused on the fostering of institutional inves-
tors as entities to watch over corporate gover-
nance of listed enterprises, in place of state 
shareholders.
Major Constraints
In moving toward full-fl edged priva-
tization of large public enterprises, the na-
scent state of China's capital market is pos-
ing the biggest problem. As the government 
withdraws from the arena of corporate gover-
nance by selling off state-owned shares, there 
would arise the risk of increased instability in 
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enterprise management unless a new frame-
work of corporate governance is developed. 
Expectations are that an effi cient capital mar-
ket, with the participation of institutional in-
vestors with a long-term investment posture, 
will provide such a new framework. But it will 
be some time before the effi cient capital mar-
ket is developed, making it inevitable for the 
process of privatization of large enterprises to 
be only gradual. 
China seems to have no choice but to 
keep for the time being the transitional sys-
tem under which the government continue to 
play a certain role in corporate governance of 
large enterprises.
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